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Abstract
This article describes the author’s experiences researching three books on
espionage history in three different countries and on three different topics.
The article describes the foreign intelligence arm of the Ministry for State
Security; a global history of secret writing from ancient to modern times;
and finally, my current project on U.S. intelligence and technology from the
Cold War to the War on Terror. The article also discusses the tensions
between national security and openness and reflects on the results of this
research and its implications for history and for national security.
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Writing about intelligence history is a challenge for historians, because
a lot of the sources are closed to researchers. My assignment was to write
about my experiences conducting espionage history research using sources
in Germany, Britain, and the United States. Surprisingly, my best access to
rich source material was not in the so-called “Stasi Archives” (of the East
German Staatssicherheitsdienst, State Security Service) as one would have
thought, but rather in the British and American Archives. Even so, all three
countries provided rich material for important historical revelations.
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Writing about Secrets
Historians need sources - primary sources, secondary sources,
interviews, archival material, and artifacts. Yet intelligence is meant to be
secret, at least for a time. Even when secrets are exposed or declassified,
every effort is made to keep methods and sources secret. As a result, writing
about intelligence history is challenging, to say the least. Not only is it
frustrating, but the finished product might not meet historical expectations
regarding what a work should be in terms of completeness and narrative
cohesiveness. Unfortunately, historians might produce just one small aspect
of the topic resembling Swiss cheese, rather than the flowing river a
narrative piece of history should be.
For this article, I’ll draw on my personal experiences researching and
writing three intelligence history books on three different topics and three
different geographic regions.1 I’ll treat them in the order I researched them:
first the Stasi, or more accurately, the foreign intelligence arm of the
Ministry for State Security; secondly, a global history of secret writing from
ancient to modern times; and finally, my current project on U.S. intelligence
and technology from the Cold War to the War on Terror. Even though one
would expect that the richest sources for my project would have been the
so-called Stasi Archives, this was not the case for reasons I shall explain.
Surprisingly, researching U.S. intelligence offers the richest primary and
secondary sources.

1

See Macrakis (2008; 2014) and Techno-Spies and the Decline of the Secret Agent, in
progress.
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Seduced by Secrets
Most people probably remember the storming of the “Stasi” (the East
German Ministry for State Security) Headquarters building shortly after the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The iconic images have been displayed again
and again in the media. Even though these images show files being secured
by citizens and other people, most people don’t know that the foreign
intelligence (like the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, or CIA, and the UK’s
Secret Intelligence Service, commonly known as MI6) files of the Ministry for
State Security - the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung (HVA) - were actually
legally destroyed in January of 1990 with the justification that every country
has secret foreign intelligence agencies, and this information would never be
made public in other countries (and as far as I know, the legality of the file
destruction was never debated or contested).
The reason many people would conclude that the “Stasi Archives”
would be the richest source of material for an intelligence historian is
because miles and miles of files became available after the collapse of
communism. And the image of miles and miles of files was also displayed on
television. It is not widely known, however, that most of the files were
internal domestic operation files.
And therein lies the problem for intelligence historians and for this
historian as I set out to write a history of the HVA’s scientific-intelligence
acquisition operations. But before the reader should despair along with me,
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a dramatic discovery was to be made later in my research. I’ll come to that
in a minute.
In the meantime, when I began my research, I had to rely on using
the domestic, internal files that sometimes also carried out scientifictechnical intelligence, and in the early years they often overlapped. I also
started to interview former intelligence officers, defectors, and agents—all of
whom were not ready to talk because of fear of imprisonment. Not
surprisingly, a defector (along with a couple of agents) - Werner Stiller proved to be the best source at the beginning of my project, along with
some crumbs from the archives. The most challenging, and least helpful, at
first, were senior intelligence officers and leaders, who clung to their secrecy
oaths and fear of prosecution. The one exception here was Markus Wolf, the
legendary spy chief of the HVA, who served as the public spokesman for the
HVA. I got a lucky break when an archivist alerted me to a case file about an
agent - a West German businessman who spied for the Stasi, codenamed
“Gorbachev” - who was run like a foreign intelligence agent, but because of
a bureaucratic quirk and the overlap of internal/domestic and foreign
intelligence, his file was preserved.
It was not until 1998 that the so-called “Stasi Archives” - the Federal
Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former
German Democratic Republic (Der Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des
Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen
Republik, or BStU) discovered a massive database called SIRA (System der
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Informationsrecherche) with information gathered by the HVA that another
piece of the foreign intelligence puzzle could be put in place.
In 1990, the CIA performed one of the biggest coups by acquiring,
through methods not totally known, the complete HVA’s agent card files called the Rosenholz files - with code names and real names, but they did
not make their find public. Only security officials could use them. Finally, the
BStU acquired the German agent cards and I was able to use them in 2006.
My book finally came out in 2008. From then on, it was really more
anthropology than history, as I pieced together the agent networks though
court files fleshed out the facts.
In addition to the card files, information reports and court cases, I also
visited the German Bundeskriminalamt's evidence collection and museums
to photograph and include artifacts.2Even when archives are open, however,
rarely can one get a case file about an agent, especially in the United States,
because these sources are heavily guarded - unless, of course, the agent
has been uncovered and disclosed by the enemy and an agency wants to
show how successful that agent was while operational. Oleg Penkovsky is a
case in point.
I cannot emphasize enough how important the SIRA database and the
Rosenholz files were, and are, for conducting research on East German
foreign intelligence. They are the backbone and the skeleton for piecing
together agent networks and information gathered and passed on. But these

2

The Federal Criminal Police, roughly equivalent to the U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).
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files do not include the flesh-and-blood agent files. For that, the court case
files were essential, along with several available foreign agent files.
Interviews with agents, defectors, leaders, and counter-intelligence officials
added some historical detail and color not available in the files.
In the end, the sources did provide enough material to illuminate
scientific-technical intelligence. In fact, together the SIRA database and the
Rosenholz files are a treasure trove for certain types of research. The SIRA
database confirmed the importance of computer espionage during the last
decade of the German Democratic Republic’s existence, and of course, the
Rosenholz files revealed the agents’ identity and motivations. Researchers
working now will obviously not have to wait as long to obtain these rich
sources discovered in the decade after the fall of the wall.
It should be noted here for readers familiar with the so-called Stasi
surveillance state and the ubiquity of the informant, that foreign intelligence
agents and domestic informants are different types. Domestic informants
belong to the secret police arm of the Ministry for State Security. Sometimes
there was some overlap when a foreign intelligence agent also spied for
state security, but this distinction needs to be pointed out, because the
secret police aspect of the Stasi is much more widely known.
The process of uncovering these secrets was indeed like peeling an
onion. It was a process of discovery extending over many years. And, of
course, revealing intentionally concealed secrets is usually not a quick
process.
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The sad part of the story is that the foreign intelligence files were
destroyed in order to protect the identity of the agents. The Rosenholz files,
however, along with some defector information, made agent names available
to counter-intelligence officials and prosecutors in the West. As a result,
many were convicted and sent to prison. In the end, both historians and
agents were losers because the archival material no longer exists, but the
agents were prosecuted nevertheless.
In this case, concealing the agents’ identity and keeping it secret was
done to protect the services sources. This seems like a perfectly reasonable
wish in the game of spy versus spy, however frustrating for the historian,
who needs the files to weave together a rich, colorful, and accurate
narrative. Reasonable secrecy is often at odds with the disclosure necessary
for a historian, and for the appetite of the public in general. So while secrecy
or concealment is sometimes used to hide illegal processes or wrongdoing
and therefore seen as something negative, for intelligence agencies, secrecy
is their lifeblood. Disclosure and leaks are the bane of their existence!

Global History of Secret Writing/Invisible Ink
It was fun shifting from the dark recesses of German history to writing
a global history of invisible ink from ancient Greece to modern times. Here
the challenges were quite different. At first I thought there was nothing, or
very little, to find on the subject. There was no book on the subject, and
there was very little other secondary source material. In part, this was
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because of the emphasis on codes and ciphers in the literature and, in part,
because in earlier periods of history, it was indeed harder to research. It left
fewer visible signs.
For my own research, I soon discovered some hidden articles, but the
real mother lode was Google books and electronic resources for the early
modern period and the eighteenth century, and the UK National Archives,
which housed original manuscripts from the early modern period as well as
rich agent files from MI5. The latter proved an exceptionally rich source for
agent material. I chose to write the history using stories to illustrate the
general history.
Of course, traditional sources like rare book and manuscript rooms
were enormously helpful. In rare book rooms like Harvard University’s
Houghton Library, the library allowed me to examine the actual manuscripts
or rare books in order to examine them for the telltale signs of invisible ink.
This was also the case for the chapter on the American Revolution, for which
I used material from the Huntington Library, the U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration, and rare book dealers. Although I could bring in an
ultraviolet light to illuminate some types of invisible ink, I was not allowed,
of course, to deface old documents by brushing them with a reagent—a
chemical used to reveal invisible ink. I was quite surprised that earlier
researchers actually used chemicals to reveal invisible ink in documents from
the American Revolution (the papers were still in private possession and
therefore not subject to federal state archives rules).
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The problem, of course, with researching invisible ink, is that I always
had the fear that the really important stuff was still hidden and hadn’t been
detected yet. Even though a lot of the material was hidden, modern-day
technology has allowed us to reveal previously hidden writing using UV
lamps and other technologies, as pointed out. But the beauty and
effectiveness of invisible ink is that unless there is suspicion that a document
might contain the substance, it remains hidden, unlike codes and ciphers,
which announce they are keeping a secret. In some ways, secret writing is a
metaphor for the world of secrets in general. What is revealed, what is
concealed? To what extent is the revealed material an accurate
representation?
Using electronic sources in addition to traditional ones really helped
speed up the research. I also found stories and material I would not have
found using key-word searches. For example, some of the material about
sympathetic ink during the Enlightenment period came from this approach
by providing me with leads about material to find, though only a little of it
was about espionage.
I found the UK National Archives the richest source of material about
secret writing and the agents who used it. Of course, MI5 (the UK’s Security
Service, Military Intelligence, Section 5) is more akin to the FBI than the CIA
- the latter being concerned with foreign intelligence—but they worked on
catching spies, and invisible ink was part of that process because it was
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evidence. But as other historians like Ben Macintyre (2010) have found, the
MI5 files are an extraordinary, rich source indeed.
In contrast to the very long time it took to pry out the secrets of the
Stasi and its foreign intelligence arm, the invisible ink book ended up being
easier and quicker to write because of a combination of traditional sources
and digital sources. Most of the project was also deeper in the recesses of
history. Some of the challenge of writing about modern intelligence history is
that it is so recent, but of course, that is an advantage also because one can
interview still-living sources.
The topic of invisible ink also touches upon the issue of protecting
methods and sources. In this instance, invisible ink is a very secret method,
one modern spy agencies fiercely protect. The CIA’s rationale for keeping
the material secret was that they could be used as building blocks for
current systems. It was not until 2011 that the CIA declassified material
from World War One invisible ink residing in the US National Archives.
Apparently, these comprised the oldest classified material in the US National
Archives.
Despite the fact that the CIA jealously guarded those secrets, I was
able to circumvent these secrecy restrictions by using material from the
Stasi files. Along with chemistry colleagues, I was able to reproduce the Cold
War formulas, material the CIA would never release because it was so
recent. The caveat in the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) denies material
relating to methods and sources.
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U.S. Intelligence History
Surprisingly, the United States also has a rich source of declassified
material. Without keeping you in suspense here, I think it is because of our
peculiar form of democracy and our First and Fourth Amendment rights including the heavy role of the media, leading to leaks. There doesn’t seem
as much room for secrecy in our form of democracy as there is in the UK
with its Official Secrets Act and stiff penalties for disclosure, or Germany:
the constant, unrelenting discussion of freedom versus national security; the
long tradition of memoir writing; and the 1966 U.S. Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA), which helps to release many classified documents. 3Nevertheless,
sources and methods are strictly guarded (and in this regard, I learned more
about truly secret methods from the Stasi archives, as well as eventually
from many sources).
As part of mandatory release of previously classified material, the CIA
offers the CIA Records Search Tool (CREST). 4 The Central Intelligence
Agency (2017) claims they have released 12 million pages online, although
many of them are published sources like newspaper and magazine articles.
Nevertheless, it is a rich source of declassified secrets along with other
declassified material not made available electronically.
However, it should be noted that the United States also overclassifies
a lot of material. As Peter Galison (2004) points out, overclassification leads
3

4

P.L. 89-487, An Act to Amend Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter
324, of the Act of June 11, 1946 (60 Stat. 238), to Clarify and Protect the Right of the
Public to Information, and for Other Purposes.
The CREST archive is located at http://www.foia.cia.gov/collection/crest-25-yearprogram-archive
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to the removal of of knowledge, especially scientific-technical knowledge.
When I write that the United States does not have as much room for secrecy
as England, I mean that the United States has more leaks and public
discussion of secrets. It also has declassified more intelligence material than
those countries. England might not have classified as much material, but it
also does not release much material from MI6 (in contrast to MI5), and there
is a stiffer sentence for leakers (Galison, 2004).
In the case of World War II, a lot of rich material was released from
OSS files as part of the Nazi documents act, and I found great material in
the National Archives FBI files for the invisible ink book.
The National Security Archive at George Washington University also
uses FOIA (often suing the government in the process) to declassify
previously secret intelligence material with areas of foci including Cuba, the
Bay of Pigs, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Both their website and electronic
source material are very rich sources for Cold War historians. Although
intelligence history is not as well institutionalized at universities in the United
States as it is in the United Kingdom, the CIA does have its Center for the
Study of Intelligence.5
Another rich source in the United States is a long tradition of memoir
writing. It seems paradoxical for them to spill the beans, but the spy chiefs
have done a lot of it along with defectors and agents. The United Kingdom
and Germany don’t produce as many memoirs (though some are notable,
such as Markus Wolf’s, but his service was dismantled). Another way to find
5

Found at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence
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sources for research is through the Association of Former Intelligence
Officers (AFIO).6 Finally, leakers and whistle-blowers have provided explosive
material relating to U.S. Intelligence. The most notable recent leaker, of
course, is Edward Snowden who leaked damning and revealing slides and
files to the press and to the world in 2013. The material offers a treasure
trove of material documenting the National Security Agency’s (NSA)
domestic and global operations.
The juiciest material, of course, is the sources—the agents. Although
many Soviets who spied for the United States have been uncovered and
written about, the same is not true of many important agents who spied for
the Soviets. I have found out through first-hand experience that the CIA will
never reveal to me directly the identity of the Cuban nationals who spied for
the CIA because of strict source protection. The CIA tells me that even if
they are dead, they might have family alive. Revealing their names would
discourage future sources because case officers assure prospective agents
that their identity will remain hidden forever.
After all, once the secret material has been declassified, it is often not
as exciting as the researcher would hope. Its allure is often the historian’s
quest to find hidden material that would illuminate the problem. Once found,
the previously hidden secret is often paltry. One example of a let-down
would be those invisible ink formulae finally declassified in 2011. Much to my
dismay, I already knew the content of the material through other sources,
some of it from the British National Archives, and some of it from published
6

See http://www.afio.com
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articles and books (many of which were obscure and only consulted by a
historian searching for specific material).
So, that’s a cursory summation of some of the types of sources
available in different countries. The scene isn’t quite as empty as one might
expect, given the secrecy surrounding the subject. However, huge holes
remain, and it is inadvisable to encourage graduate students interested in
this research unless a large body of material has already been declassified—
which is often the case with U.S. and UK records—as it is a long road to the
house of secrets.

Some Reflections on Secrecy and Historical Research
The purpose of this article was to describe the frustrations and high
points of conducting research with formerly secret materials. The topic
naturally lends itself to reflections on the nature of secrecy, what is kept
secret, and whether the information should be kept secret. What did this
material reveal that was noteworthy? Should it have been kept secret?
There is clearly a tension between an intelligence agency’s need for
keeping methods and sources secret and a historian’s or journalist’s need for
openness. The compromise to this dilemma is probably the one reached in
the United States, whereby intelligence material can be declassified after a
period of time (usually exempting sources and methods).
The problem for a historian with keeping intelligence agency secrets
locked up is that a historical period or episode can be misunderstood without
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the missing piece of information. One glaring example is that of the so-called
VENONA files. The VENONA project was a four-decade counterintelligence
program started in 1943 by the U.S. Signals Intelligence Service (later NSA)
that intercepted communications between the Soviet KGB and GRU and their
agents in the United States. The program was only declassified in 1995,
after the massive efforts of Daniel Moynihan (1998), a strong senatorial
advocate of openness, who decried over-classification and secrecy.
Even the U.S. president did not know about the VENONA secrets. The
agencies that kept the program secret needed to do so; otherwise, the
Soviet Union would have known their cables were being read, and they
would have ceased to communicate with their agents. It was not known at
the time, for example, that the VENONA information was the main piece of
evidence against Julius Rosenberg. If this had come to light at the time, the
Soviet KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti, Committee for State
Security) would have rolled up their agent network. However, they would
also have shown that Ethel only played a very minor role in the atomic
espionage. More broadly, the intercepted communications showed the extent
of Soviet espionage against America. With this information, the McCarthy era
should be rewritten.
The release of these files suggest that there is a right time to
declassify material without jeopardizing sources and methods. The case of
the Stasi is another example of this notion. The Stasi case was
unprecedented, because it is unusual for a country to disappear along with
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its intelligence agencies! The sad part of this story is that the East German
foreign intelligence unit of the Ministry for State Security was allowed to
destroy its files using the protection-of-sources-and-methods “mantra” so
common among intelligence professionals. In the end, as undestroyed or
purloined files became slowly available, the agents were uncovered, caught,
and sentenced to prison (although the sentences were not as long as spies
get in the United States, for example). (And although it initially took me a
while, as a researcher, to obtain this material, the wait is now not as long for
others wishing to use them; however, the case files themselves have been
largely destroyed.) Despite the wait, the Stasi files proved a very rich source
of material. For my own subject of scientific-technical espionage, it
suggested that, surprisingly, espionage did help East Germany in the short
term but in the end stifled true creativity and led to the implosion of East
Germany itself, because of its reliance on Western computer technology.
Finally, I should mention one more example of forcing the CIA to
declassify material it would never have declassified because it revealed
methods and sources. Unusually, OSS material and early Cold War
intelligence material was exempt from classification because of the Nazi War
Crimes Disclosure Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-246). The Act was used to find
information on the Holocaust and war crimes, but it also applied to people
with Nazi pasts who worked for the U.S. government. This led to a massive
uncovering of the way in which the CIA used agents with Nazi pasts against
the Communists. The Act also helped to declassify information about the
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Gehlen Organization, the German Federal Intelligence Service
(Bundesnachrichtendienst [BND]), and the CIA. This information was also
invaluable in illustrating the way in which intelligence agencies do unethical
things under the cloak of secrecy and expediency (Brietman et al, 2005;
Brietman 2001).
And even though some of the richest sources of material I found were
in the British MI5 files for the secret writing topic, the more significant
material historically resided in the U.S. and Stasi files. The question then
arises: Did revealing the secrets damage national security? The answer is
no. However, if the material had been unveiled earlier, it would likely have
damaged national security. This only underscores the compromise measure
of declassifying material once it has reached its expiration date.
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